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It is sometimes forgotten that measurement of psychological variables is an 
interaction between the individual, the test material and the context in which the 
measure is taken.  In the case of clinically administered cognitive tests, such as the 
WAIS intelligence test, standardization of test administration, scoring and 
interpretation is explicit and testers require training to ensure that they do not 
introduce error into the measurement procedure and auditing is needed to ensure 
that tester performance does not drift over time.  Standardization is essential for the 
calibration of the test.  The benefits of standardization are that it eliminates 
systematic errors and facilitates the valid use of norms.   While the importance of 
standardization is self-evidence for complex cognitive tests it is no less important for 
the many questionnaire measures and rating scales in common use.  The British 
experimental psychologist E.C. Poulton concluded that Ôquantitative subjective 
assessments are almost always biased, sometimes completely misleadingÕ [5; 6] and 
making a simple rating can be a non-trivial event.  The list of features known to 
affect ratings of experimentally controlled sensory and social stimuli is extensive 
and attempts have been made to integrate both response, stimulus and contextual 
characteristics into predictive models c.f. [4; 11]. Much is understood about factors 
contributing to subjective ratings of sensory intensity and the affective component 
of pain when the values of the pain stimuli are known, controlled and experimentally 
manipulated[1].  Determining sources of bias and unreliability in ratings of clinical 
pain is more problematic and less understood but understanding them has practical 
implications.  Shannon Smith and her co-authors, in an article published in this issue 
of PAIN [9], argue that increasing the reliability of ratings should improve the 
precision of measurement and hence the discriminability between treatments with 
differential effectiveness. 
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 Smith and her colleagues took a pragmatic approach to improving the 
reliability of daily self-reported clinical pain.  They reasoned that provision of 
training and the addition of daily prompts i.e., enhancing the standardization 
protocol, should improve the reliability of pain ratings.  Chronic pain patients with 
various diagnoses returned daily ratings of least, average and worst pain via the 
telephone.  A control group (C) received no training, a second group received 
training (T) and the third group had both training and a daily reminder of the basic 
training instruction (T+).  The expectation was that training would increase the 
reliability coefficients and decrease the number of inconsistent rankings of least, 
average and worst pain experienced each day.  In the latter case the number of 
inconsistent rankings in the enhanced training group was 0.9% compared with 7% in 
the control group.  Contrary to expectation there was no evidence that training had 
any impact on the reliability of ratings assessed using test-retest method.  Indeed 
during the first post-training week it appeared that those in the T+ group were less 
reliable.  Why might this be so? 
 Amongst the many possible factors there are two features worth considering.  
First is the application of the concept of reliability in this particular case.  In classical 
test theory reliability is the ratio of the true score variance to the sum of true and 
error score variance, where the errors are only random.  The presence of systematic 
errors will further contribute a mis-estimation of the true score.  Furthermore it is 
assumed that the true score is fixed for any one estimation of reliability.  As neither 
the true nor error score is directly observable various practical methods (test-retest, 
internal consistency and parallel forms) that rely on forms of the correlation are 
required to estimate it.  If the true score fluctuates for valid reasons then the 
reliability estimated by the test-retest method will be compromised.  Thus one 
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would not consider estimating the reliability of an outcome measure by correlating 
pre-treatment and post-treatment test scores. 
 The second issue concerns how people might make pain judgments. Smith et 
al. rightly note that there are likely to be two salient sources of bias (systematic 
errors) affecting the estimation of pain; 1) scale anchoring effects and, 2) daily 
variations in context e.g. changes in mood, current pain, and physical setting.  They 
sought to counter these by training patients to scale between the least and worst 
imaginable pain.  They argued that two imagined pain anchors would be fixed 
relative to fluctuating personal experience (an untested but testable assumption).  
We do not know what these personal anchors were, how they were used, or whether 
the imagined experience is constant over time.  How do people scale and remember 
imagined pain?  More importantly what aspect of the imagine pain is reimagined and 
used as an anchor at the point of rating. We know that re-experiencing the 
somatosensory-intensity aspect of pain is rare, although people are able to give a 
summative evaluative assessment of  remembered episodic pain and recall contextual 
information around the experience [2; 3].  Smith et al. attempted to minimize 
contextual effects on judgment by instructing patients to Ôreflect again on the 
intensity and duration É (and) É focus only on pain intensity rather than other 
physical and emotional experiences like fatigue, stress and pains other than the 
targeted pain conditionÕ.  Even if it were possible to exclude these aspects of context 
from judgment reflection on intensity and duration for single pain episodes is known 
to be subject to systematic bias by the peak-end phenomenon [8].  The extent to 
which the peak-end phenomenon applies to recurrent episodic or variation in 
persistent pain is unknown, but other studies of recall of chronic pain experience 
show that expectation of the time-course of pain, experiential mismatch [7] and 
stable individual differences [10] are potential sources of systematic bias.  In 
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summary selecting and constructing a model for the recall pain gives several options.  
Which factors are appropriate in particular contexts is an issue for debate based on 
the likelihood of being able to generalise from different studies.  
 The paradox of the Smith et al study is that as a consequence of training, by 
removing a relatively large element of systematic bias, patients will show greater 
variability in their day-to-day ratings and thus reduce the estimate of reliability 
assessed by the conventional test-retest method.  This may be what was observed in 
the early stages of the study in the T+ group.  The article by Smith and colleagues 
raises important issues and highlights the tension between the need to answer 
pragmatic questions of relevance to clinical research and the need for better 
theoretical understanding of very basic measurement problems.  This commentary 
has highlighted the fragmented research base of memory for pain and its 
implications; a topic which should arguably receive greater systematic investigation. 
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